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State not liable for false imprisonment where defect in subject
matterjurisdictionof committing court not apparenton face of legal
process.
Subject matter jurisdiction has proved an elusive concept and

one susceptible to various definitions. 21 1 A distinction frequently

arises between a court's competence to act upon a general category
of cases and a court's power to adjudicate a particular action or
proceeding within that category.1 2 Traditionally, it has been stated
that where a court lacks competence, its orders and process are

void,2' 1 and state officials may be held liable for the enforcement of
211In Thrasher v. United States Liab. Ins. Co., 19 N.Y.2d 159, 225 N.E.2d 503, 278
N.Y.S.2d 793 (1967), subject matter jurisdiction was defined as "'the power to adjudge
concerning the general question involved, and is not dependent upon the state of facts which
may appear in a particular case. . . .'" Id. at 166, 225 N.E.2d at 506, 278 N.Y.S.2d at 798,
quoting Hunt v. Hunt, 72 N.Y. 217, 229 (1878). In Hunt, the Court further defined subject
matter jurisdiction as "the power to act upon the general . . . abstract question and, to
determine and adjudge whether the particular facts presented call for the exercise of the
abstract power." 72 N.Y. at 230. The concept has received several other interpretations. See,
e.g., Cooper v. Davis, 231 App. Div. 527, 529 (3d Dep't 1931) (subject matter jurisdiction is
the "power to hear and determine").
212 Subject matter jurisdiction, i.e., competence, is conferred on the courts by the state.
RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 7, Comment a (1942). The distinction between lack of competence and absence of power in a particular case because of limits placed on the court's power
to adjudicate has been recognized frequently by the courts. See, .e.g., Lacks v. Lacks, 41
N.Y.2d 71, 75, 359 N.E.2d 384, 387, 390 N.Y.S.2d 875, 877-78 (1976) ("[albsence of competence to entertain an action deprives the court of 'subject matter jurisdiction'; absence of
power to reach the merits does not"); Woolsey v. Morris, 96 N.Y. 311, 314 (1884) (ministerial
officers not liable for judgments rendered by courts having general jurisdiction over subject
matter despite court's lack of power to adjudicate particular case); Taylor Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 301 Ill.
381, 134 N.E. 169 (1922) (subject matter jurisdiction refers to power to
act in a general class of cases, rather than in a particular case within such class).
2"2 Either the court or a party to the action may question the court's competence throughout the pendency of the action. See CPLR 3211(a)(2), commentary at 17 (McKinney 1970)
(motion to dismiss cause of action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction). The question may
even be raised on appeal. See, e.g., Mansfield, C. & L.M. Ry. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379 (1884);
Page v. Wright, 116 F.2d 449 (7th Cir. 1950). Furthermore, final judgment may be collaterally
attacked where the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S.
(18 Wall.) 457 (1874). However, where the court had competence over the general type of case
involved, a collateral attack will not be permitted to challenge a court's power to act in a
particular case. See In re Estate of Rougeron, 17 N.Y.2d 264, 217 N.E.2d 639, 270 N.Y.S.2d
578, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 899 (1966); Taylor Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 301 ll. 381,
134 N.E. 169 (1922). Furthermore, a court's determination that it has proper jurisdiction may
become res judicata. See Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371,
377-78 (1940); Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1938); Lynn v. Lynn, 192 Misc. 720, 82
N.Y.S.2d 397 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1948). For a discussion of the desirability of applying
res judicata to determinations by courts that they have subject matter jurisdiction, see
Dobbs, Beyond Bootstrap:Foreclosing the Issue of Subject-MatterJurisdictionBefore Final
Judgment, 51 MINN. L. REv. 491, 494 (1967), wherein Professor Dobbs states:
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those orders.214 Where, however, a court, although otherwise competent to hear the kind of cause before it, lacks the power to adjudicate
the particular action, confusion exists as to the effect to be accorded
its acts. More specifically, the question presented is whether the
state may be subjected to liability for the acts of its officials in
carrying out the mandates of a court lacking such power. Recently,
1 5 the Court of Appeals held that state
in Nuernberger v. State,"
officials cannot be held liable for enforcing the commitment orders
of a court having general competence over criminal matters but
216
lacking the power to prosecute the particular proceeding.
The plaintiff in Nuernbergerwas convicted and imprisoned for
assaulting his 11-year old daughter. 21 7 On appeal of the conviction,
the Court of Appeals 28 noted that although the county court has
general competence over criminal matters,2 '1 9 the Family Court
Act 220 vests exclusive original jurisdiction over assaults between

family members in the family court. Since the county court, thereWhen a court has jurisdiction to decide an issue, it has the power to decide wrongly
as well as rightly. Even if its decision in favor of its own jurisdictions is erroneous,
it is valid. It may be reversed on appeal, but if an appeal is not taken, the decision
stands, and is binding, erroneous or not.
Id. (citation omitted). See also RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 7, Comment b (1942).
211 See, e.g., Politano v. Jacoby, 240 App. Div. 733 (2d Dep't) (mem.), af'd, 263 N.Y.
573 (1933), Savacool v. Boughton, 5 Wend. 170, 172 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jud. 1830); cf. Troutman
v. State, 273 App. Div. 619, 622, 79 N.Y.S.2d 709, 712 (3d Dep't 1948) (state liable for
complying with order issued by court lacking personal jurisdiction).
215 41 N.Y.2d 111, 359 N.E.2d 412, 390 N.Y.S.2d 904 (1976).
211Id. at 113, 359 N.E.2d at 413, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 905.
2 In 1966 the claimant was indicted and tried for three crimes: incest, assault in the
second degree, and impairing the morals of a minor. Convicted on the assault and impairment
charges, Nuernberger received a sentence of 3 to 6 years on the assault conviction and a
suspended sentence of 1 year on the impairment conviction. Nuernberger was subsequently
imprisoned pursuant to the county court's commitment order for a period of 27 months when
his assault conviction was reversed. Id. at 113-14, 359 N.E.2d at 414, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 905.
2I People v. Nuernberger, 25 N.Y.2d 179, 250 N.E.2d 352, 303 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1969) (per
curiam).
21 41 N.Y.2d at 118, 359 N.E.2d at 416, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 908. The New York State
Constitution provides in pertinent part: "The county court shall have jurisdiction over the
following classes of actions and proceedings which shall be originated in such county court
in the manner provided bylaw. . all crimes and other violations of law. . . ... N.Y. CONST.
art. 6 § 11 (a).
22 The Family Court Act provides: "The family court has exclusive original jurisdiction
• . . over any proceeding concerning acts which would constitute disorderly conduct, harassment, menacing, reckless endangerment, an assault or an attempt [sic] assault between
spouses or between parent and child or between members of the same family or household."
Id. § 812. The legislative scheme is designed to permit civil rather than criminal treatment
of "family offenses" in the first instance. Furthermore, the family court is authorized to
render practical help to the parties in the form of "orders of protection and support and...
conciliation procedures." Id. § 811.
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fore, did not possess the requisite power to adjudicate the assault
in the first instance,22 ' the Court of Appeals reversed the conviction
and remanded the proceedings to the family court." Plaintiff then
commenced the present action for false imprisonment, contending
that he was entitled to damages because the county court in which
he was tried and convicted lacked jurisdiction to prosecute the assault.2" Hence, he argued, the court's mandates were null and void,
thereby providing no protection to the custodial officials who incarcerated him pursuant to the court's order.
Acknowledging that the county court's lack of jurisdiction to
adjudicate the assault necessitated the reversal of the plaintiffs
conviction, the Court, in an opinion authored by Chief Judge Breitel, asserted that the state is not necessarily liable in damages when
its officials dutifully comply with the process of a court so lacking
the power of adjudication. 22 ' In rejecting Nuernberger's damage

claim, the Chief Judge noted initially that since the county court is
a court of general criminal jurisdiction, it is competent, at least in
the first instance, to determine whether it could properly retain
jurisdiction over the proceeding.2 25 Therefore, the Court reasoned,
2' When a court of criminal jurisdiction receives either a complaint or an indictment
containing an offense listed in § 812 of the Family Court Act, the court is required to transfer
the matter to the family court sitting in the same county as the criminal court. Id. § 813.
Once received, the family court may treat the matter as a familial problem and order such
help it deems necessary, see note 220 supra, or may elect to transfer the matter back to the
criminal court if it decides that it cannot provide adequate relief, id. § 811.
In 41 N.Y.2d at 114, 359 N.E.2d at 414, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 905, citing People v. Nuernberger, 25 N.Y.2d 179, 183, 250 N.E.2d 352, 353, 303 N.Y.S.2d 74, 76 (1969) (per curiam).
Nuernberger was then released from prison and placed on probation. 41 N.Y.2d at 114, 359
N.E.2d at 414, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 906.
223Nuernberger v. State, 40 App. Div. 2d 939, 337 N.Y.S.2d 704 (4th Dep't 1972) (mem.),
rev'd, 41 N.Y.2d 111,359 N.E.2d 412, 390 N.Y.S.2d 904 (1976). Reversing the Court of Claim's
dismissal of the action, the appellate division stated that although the state cannot be held
liable for false imprisonment where the legal process is valid on its face, the rule is not
applicable when the process was issued by a court totally lacking jurisdiction of the subject
matter. See note 214 and accompanying text supra; cf., Williams v. State, 9 App. Div. 2d
415, 194 N.Y.S.2d 421 (4th Dep't 1959) (per curiam), aff'd, 8 N.Y.2d 886, 168 N.E.2d 723,
203 N.Y.S.2d 925 (1960) (mem.) (state liable for wrongful detention and imprisonment based
upon lack of jurisdiction of court to act pursuant to illegal arrest and filing of void information).
" 41 N.Y.2d at 112-13, 359 N.E.2d at 413, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 905.
Id. at 113, 359 N.E.2d at 413, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 905. See note 221 supra; Dobbs, The
Validationof Void Judgments: The Bootstrap Principle,53 VA. L. REv. 1003 (1967). Professor
Dobbs believes that all courts have at least the authority to determine whether they have
jurisdiction and that once a court makes a determination as to jurisdiction, this determination should only be subject to attack on appeal. Id. at 1005. The RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS
§ 10 (1972) similarly suggests that:
(1) Where a court has jurisdiction over the parties and determines that it has
jurisdiction over the subject matter, the parties cannot collaterally attack the judg-
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the county court's orders were certainly not equivalent to orders
emanating from a court totally devoid of all jurisdiction over the
subject matter.
Conceding that the acts and proceedings of a court lacking
subject matter jurisdiction in a particular case are null and void, the
Court nevertheless cautioned against adherence to a deceptively
simplistic rule.22 In Harty v. State,2 7 observed Chief Judge Breitel,
the Court of Appeals denied a claim for wrongful detention although
the committing court's "jurisdiction" was defective because of a 6year delay in sentencing. The significance of Harty, declared the
Chief Judge, lies in the recognition that despite a possible defect in
the court's power to render a valid sentence, sufficient power remained in the court "to protect officials who carried out its man22
dates." 1
As further evidence of the existence of exceptions to the general
rule, the NuernbergerCourt posited as conclusively establishing the
principle that "courts without 'subject matter jurisdiction' [can]
nonetheless [issue] binding orders, ' 22 the phenomenon that in
some instances a court's mistaken determination that it has subject
matter jurisdiction is res judicata and not subject to collateral attack. 0 Attributing the sporadic application of both the rule and its
exceptions to the "elastic and versatile use of the term 'jurisdiction,' "23 Chief Judge Breitel concluded: "Sometimes this lack [of
ment on the ground that the court did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter,
unless the policy underlying the doctrine of res judicata is outweighed by the policy
against permitting the court to act beyond its jurisdiction.
Id. See note 213 supra.

Id. 41 N.Y.2d at 115, 359 N.E.2d at 415, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 906-07.
27 N.Y.2d 698, 262 N.E.2d 220, 304 N.Y.S.2d 14 (1970). In Harty,the Court of Appeals
affirmed the appellate division's denial of Harty's claim for false imprisonment. 29 App. Div.
2d 243, 287 N.Y.S.2d 306 (3d Dep't 1968), rev'g 52 Misc. 2d 255, 275 N.Y.S.2d 735 (Ct. CI.
1966). Harty's original conviction for first-degree robbery previously had been reversed on the
ground that the committing court had lost "jurisdiction" due to a 6-year delay in sentencing.
People ex rel. Harty v. Fay, 10 N.Y.2d 374, 179 N.E.2d 483, 223 N.Y.S.2d 468 (1961). In
rejecting Harty's subsequent damage claim, the appellate division suggested that the real
basis for the Court of Appeals' reversal was the committing court's erroneous determination
that the sentence could be imposed rather than the existence of a jurisdictional defect.
Nevertheless, the court said that "the decisive matter in the present case is that in the
original proceedings the court had such jurisdiction of the subject matter. . . to enable it to
make a binding order.
... 29 App. Div. 2d at 244-45, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 307, aff'd, 27 N.Y.2d
698, 262 N.E.2d 220, 304 N.Y.S.2d 14 (1970).
m 41 N.Y.2d at 116, 359 N.E.2d at 415, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 907.
2 Id. at 116-17, 359 N.E.2d at 416, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 907-08.
2" See Dobbs, The Validation of Void Judgments: The Bootstrap Principle,53 VA. L.
REv. 1003 (1967); RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 10 (1972).
13 41 N.Y.2d at 117, 359 N.E.2d at 416, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 908.
'
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jurisdiction] is fatal to the validity of any act of the tribunal. And
sometimes it results in valid process or mandate because the issuing
court, as in this case, was not wholly without competence to adjudicate something in the action before it."

'

Finally, the Court concluded, even if the county court's commitment orders were void, the claimant would not be entitled automatically to damages simply because the administrative officials
discharged their lawfully imposed obligation.2 3 The "facial invalid-

ity" of the court's commitment papers was not readily apparent
because the county court was otherwise competent to determine
criminal matters24 and, furthermore, not every intrafamily crime is
cognizable as a family court offense. 5 The Court also noted that
although the family court has "exclusive original jurisdiction" over
"acts which would constitute . . . an assault . . . between parent
and child, '236 the county court is not entirely foreclosed from exer-

cising jurisdiction over such acts since the family court is empowered to transfer jurisdiction to a criminal court. 7 Consequently,
Chief Judge Breitel surmised that the officials complying with the
order of confinement in Nuernberger"may have assumed, reasonably," that the matter had been transferred from the family court to
the county court. 5 It was not until the Court of Appeals reversed
the plaintiff's conviction that the required "facial" invalidity became "clear." ' 9
In Nuernberger,the Court of Appeals specifically addressed the
question whether the state may be subjected to liability for the
compliance of its officials with legal process issued by a court lacking power to adjudicate a particular proceeding. Although the Court
held the state cannot be held liable for false imprisonment where
the jurisdictional defect is not apparent on the face of the committing order, the Court's holding is apparently limited to the situation
where, as in Nuernberger, the court has competence at least to
determine whether it has jurisdiction. It would appear that where
=2

I

Id.
Id. at 113, 359 N.E.2d at 413, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 905.

2 Id. at 114, 359 N.E.2d at 414, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 906.
See note 220 supra.
See, e.g., People v. Lewis, 29 N.Y.2d 923, 279 N.E.2d 856, 327 N.Y.S.2d 544 (1972)
(mem.) (incest not within jurisdiction of family court); People v. Nuernberger, 25 N.Y.2d 179,
250 N.E.2d 352, 303 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1969) (per curiam) (impairing the morals of a minor not
subject to exclusive original jurisdiction of family court).
1 41 N.Y.2d at 114, 359 N.E.2d at 414, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 906, quoting N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT
§ 812 (McKinney 1975).
41 N.Y.2d at 115, 359 N.E.2d at 414-15, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 906.
n9 Id., 359 N.E.2d at 415, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 906.
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the committing court has general jurisdiction over the category of
cases involved, the fact that the legislature has removed, in the first
instance, jurisdiction over a specific proceeding does not totally
deprive the original court of all competence. Therefore, legal process
issued by that court as a result of an erroneous jurisdictional determination will not give rise to a claim for false imprisonment.
Application of foreign objects discovery rule extended to cause of
action in negligence and breach of warranty.
Pursuant to the traditional New York rule, a malpractice action
accrues upon the commission of the alleged act of malpractice.240 In
Flanaganv. Mount Eden GeneralHospital,'4 however, the Court of
Appeals held that where a foreign object is negligently left in a
patient's body,2 4 2 a cause of action for medical malpractice does not
accrue until the patient discovers or could reasonably discover the
malpractice. Although the Flanagandiscovery rule, subsequently
codified in CPLR 214-a, 44 evolved in the medical malpractice setting, the Supreme Court, New York County, in Reis v. Pfizer, Inc.,245
recently extended the rule's application to an action grounded in
negligence and breach of warranty for injuries resulting from allegedly defective polio vaccine.2 4 In Reis, an oral polio vaccine manu240 See,

e.g., Conklin v. Draper, 254 N.Y. 620, 173 N.E. 829 (1930); Gilbert Properties,

Inc. v. Millstein, 40 App. Div. 2d 100, 338 N.Y.S.2d 370 (1st Dep't 1972), aff'd mem., 33
N.Y.2d 857, 307 N.E.2d 257, 352 N.Y.S.2d 198 (1973).
24124 N.Y.2d 427, 248 N.E.2d 871, §01 N.Y.S.2d 23 (1969).
242 The plaintiff in Flanaganunderwent surgery for a gall bladder ailment in 1958. After
she began to experience pain in 1966, X-ray analysis revealed that surgical clamps were
lodged in her abdominal region.
23 24 N.Y.2d at 431, 248 N.E.2d at 872-73, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 27.
214 CPLR 214-a, applicable to actions accruing on or after July 1, 1975, provides in
pertinent part:
An action for medical malpractice must be commenced within two years and
six months of the act, omission or failure complained of. . . provided, however,
that where the action is based upon the discovery of a foreign object in the body of
the patient, the action may be commenced within one year of the date of such
discovery or of the date of discovery of facts which would reasonably lead to such
discovery, whichever is earlier.
It has been suggested by one commentator that in foreign object cases the 1-year period
is exclusive, i.e., the 2 1/2-year limitation period applicable to other medical malpractice
actions is not available to the plaintiff. CPLR 214-a, commentary at 66 (McKinney Supp.
1977). Contra, 1 WK&M 1 214-1.05 (plaintiff entitled to "whichever period is longer").
245 176 N.Y.L.J. 82, Oct. 27, 1976, at 8, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County).
2I In apparent conflict with Reis are three New York supreme court decisions in which
recovery was denied. Thornton v. Roosevelt Hosp., 175 N.Y.L.J. 50, Mar. 15, 1976, at 8, col.
3 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County) (decedent developed cancer 19 years after injection with radioactive
substance); Florulli v. Shrag, 174 N.Y.L.J. 8, July 11, 1975, at 12, col. 7 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County), aff'd mem., 54 App. Div. 2d 683, 387 N.Y.S.2d 547 (2d Dep't 1976) (plaintiff's

